

The optimal switching problem with signed switching costs

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Outlines

- ▶ Motivation and setting of the switching problem.
- ▶ The framework of signed switching costs
- ▶ Verification Theorem. Optimal strategy.
- ▶ The Markovian case and HJB system of PDEs.

1. Motivation and setting of the switching problem

- ▶ $B := (B_t)_{t \leq T}$ a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, \mathcal{F}, P) whose completed natural filtration is $(F_t)_{t \leq T}$.
- ▶ C is a power plant.

1.1. Features of the power plant

- ▶ The power plant \mathbf{C} has $m \geq 3$ modes of production (if e.g. $m = 3$, "1=no production", "2=normal mode" and "3=intensive one"). The case of $m = 2$ is dual.
- ▶ Electricity cannot be stored, when produced it should be sold and consumed. The manager of \mathbf{C} will put it dynamically in the most profitable mode.
- ▶ If \mathbf{C} is in mode $i \in \mathcal{J} := \{1, \dots, m\}$, the yield per dt is $\psi_i(t, \omega)dt$.
- ▶ Switching \mathbf{C} from mode i to mode $j \neq i$ at t induces a payoff which equals to

$$\ell_{ij}(t, \omega)$$

an adapted continuous stochastic process.

1.2. Switching strategies

A management strategy of \mathbf{C} has **two components** δ and ξ

- ▶ (i) $\delta = (\tau_n)_{n \geq 0}$ a sequence of stopping times such that $\tau_n \leq \tau_{n+1}$ and $\tau_n \rightarrow T$. At τ_n the manager switches the production from the current mode to another one.
- ▶ (ii) $\xi = (\xi_n)_{n \geq 0}$ a sequence of *r.v.'s* such that:

$$\xi_0 = 1 \text{ and } \forall n \geq 1, \xi_n \in \mathcal{J} \text{ and } \xi_n \text{ is } F_{\tau_n} - \text{meas..}$$

ξ_n is the new working mode chosen at time τ_n .

- ▶ The pair (δ, ξ) is called **a switching strategy of management strategy** of the power plant. \square

1.3. The payoff

Let $(u_t)_{t \leq T}$ be the process indicator of the production mode at t of **C**:

$$u_0 = 1 \text{ and } u_t = \xi_n \text{ if } t \in]\tau_n, \tau_{n+1}] \text{ (} n \geq 0 \text{)}.$$

When a strategy (δ, ξ) is implemented the yield is given by:

$$J(\delta, \xi) := \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^T \psi_{u_s}(s) ds - \sum_{n \geq 1} \ell_{\xi_{n-1}, \xi_n}(\tau_n) \mathbb{1}_{[\tau_n < T]} + G_{u_T} \right].$$

G_{u_T} is the terminal payoff at time T .

Remark : (i) The process $u = (u_t)_{t \leq T}$ is in a one-to-one correspondence with (δ, ξ) .

(ii) When $\ell_{ij}(\tau) > 0$ (resp. < 0), the switching from i to j at τ incurs a cost (rep. a subsidy or profit) for the decision maker. \square

1.4. Problems

- 1) The wellposedness of the problem if **we do not have** $l_{ij} \geq 0$.
- 2) Existence of an optimal strategy (δ^*, ξ^*) , i.e.,

$$J(\delta^*, \xi^*) = \sup_{(\delta, \xi)} J(\delta, \xi).$$

- 3) What can be said about

$$\sup_{(\delta, \xi)} J(\delta, \xi)$$

in terms of characterization, properties, simulation, etc. ?

Remark : The quantity

$$\Xi := \sup_{(\delta, \xi)} J(\delta, \xi)$$

is the price of the power plant in the energy market. □

The model fits also for:

- (i) a change of technology of a corporate;
- (ii) the management of a portfolio (allocation) of life insurances (pensions, etc.) in a financial market;
- (iii) the management of a cluster in cyber-security;
- (iv) crude oil fields, etc.



Remark : There are several papers on this subject. Mainly in the case when the switching payoffs are **non-negative + appropriate assumptions**.

2. The framework of signed switching payoffs

Assumptions:

i) For any $i, j \in \mathcal{J}$, the stochastic process $t \in [0, T] \mapsto l_{ij}(t)$ is increasing (resp. decreasing).

ii) $l_{ij}(\cdot)$ satisfy the **triangle inequality**, i.e., for any $i, j, k \in \mathcal{J}$, $\forall t \leq T$,

$$l_{ij}(t) < l_{ik}(t) + l_{kj}(t).$$

$l_{ii} = 0$; $l_{ij} \in \mathcal{S}^2$ (cont. uniformly square integrable processes).

iii) **Consistency condition:** The terminal payoffs G_i are F_T -r.v. and verify: For any $i \in \mathcal{J}$,

$$\mathbb{E}[(G_i)^2] < \infty \text{ and } G_i \geq \max_{i \in \mathcal{J} - \{i\}} \{G_j - l_{ij}(T)\}.$$

Remark

- ▶ The triangle inequality implies the *non free loop property*, i.e., for any sequence of indices $i_1, \dots, i_k \in \mathcal{J}$ such that $i_1 = i_k$ and $\text{card}\{i_1, \dots, i_k\} = k - 1$ we have:

$$\ell_{i_1 i_2}(t) + \ell_{i_2 i_3}(t) + \dots + \ell_{i_{k-1} i_k}(t) + \ell_{i_k i_1}(t) > 0$$

because

$$\begin{aligned} & \ell_{i_1 i_2}(t) + \ell_{i_2 i_3}(t) + \dots + \ell_{i_{k-1} i_k}(t) + \ell_{i_k i_1}(t) \\ & > \ell_{i_1 i_3}(t) + \ell_{i_3 i_4}(t) + \dots + \ell_{i_{k-1} i_k}(t) + \ell_{i_k i_1}(t) \\ & \dots \\ & > \ell_{i_1 i_1}(t) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ **Example:** $m = 2$, $\ell_{12} = -1$ and $\ell_{21} = 2$.

Admissibility: A switching strategy $(\delta, \xi) := (\tau_n, \xi_n)_{n \geq 0}$ is called

admissible if:

(i) $\tau_n \leq \tau_{n+1}$ and

$$\mathbb{P}[\tau_n < T, \forall n \geq 0] = 0.$$

(ii) ξ_n is a \mathcal{J} -valued \mathcal{F}_{τ_n} -r.v. such that for any n :

- $\mathbb{P}[\xi_n = \xi_{n+1}, \tau_n < T] = 0$.
- the **n -partial payoff** (payoff after n switches):

$$C_n^{\delta, \xi} := \sum_{m=1}^n \ell_{\xi_{m-1} \xi_m}(\tau_m) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_m < T]}$$

verifies:

$$\mathbb{E}[\sup_{n \geq 1} |C_n^{\delta, \xi}|^2] < \infty.$$

In this case, the sequence $(C_n^{\delta, \xi})_{n \geq 1}$ converges in $L^2(d\mathbb{P})$ to

$$C^{\delta, \xi} := \sum_{m \geq 1} \ell_{\xi_{m-1} \xi_m}(\tau_m) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_m < T]}.$$

Proposition: Assume that the triangle inequality holds. Then for all $N \geq 1$ and any $(\tau_n, \xi_n)_{n \leq N}$ (an N -truncated strategy) we have:

i) If the switching costs are increasing in time, then :

$$\underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^N -\ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j)\mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]}}_{-C_N^{\delta, \xi}} \leq \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |\ell_{\xi_0 k}(\tau_1)|. \quad (1)$$

(ii) If the switching costs are decreasing in time, then:

$$-C_N^{\delta, \xi} = \sum_{j=1}^N -\ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j)\mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \leq \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}} (|\ell_{\xi_0 k}(T)|). \quad (2)$$

Proof: By induction. We focus on (i).

(1) obviously holds for $N=1$. Suppose it holds up to $N-1$. Let

$$\mathbb{D} = \{ \omega \in \Omega \text{ such that } \ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(\tau_N) < 0 \},$$

then:

$$\begin{aligned} -C_N^{\delta, \xi} &= -\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \\ &= -\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}^c} - \sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}}. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

For the first term,

$$\begin{aligned} -\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}^c} &\leq -\sum_{j=1}^{N-1} \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}^c} \\ &\leq \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |\ell_{\xi_0 k}(\tau_1)| \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}^c} \end{aligned}$$

For the other term in (3), since $[\tau_N < T] \subset [\tau_{N-1} < T]$ and $\ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(\tau_{N-1}) \leq \ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(\tau_N)$, then (on \mathbb{D})

$$\begin{aligned}
 & - \sum_{n=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}} \\
 & = \left[- \sum_{j=1}^{N-2} \ell_{\xi_{j-1},\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \right. \\
 & \quad \left. - \ell_{\xi_{N-2}\xi_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1}) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_{N-1} < T]} - \ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(\tau_N) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_N < T]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}}. \\
 & \leq \left[- \sum_{j=1}^{N-2} \ell_{\xi_{j-1},\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \right. \\
 & \quad \left. - (\ell_{\xi_{N-2}\xi_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1}) + \ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(\tau_{N-1})) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_{N-1} < T]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}}.
 \end{aligned}$$

By the triangle inequality we get,

$$\begin{aligned}
 & - \sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}} \\
 & \leq \left[- \sum_{j=1}^{N-2} \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} - \ell_{\xi_{N-2}l}(\tau_{N-1}) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_{N-1} < \tau]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}} \\
 & = \left[\sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \left[- \sum_{j=1}^{N-2} \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} - \ell_{\xi_{N-2}l}(\tau_{N-1}) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_{N-1} < \tau]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{[\xi_N=l]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}} \\
 & = \left[\sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \left[- \sum_{j=1}^{N-1} \ell_{\tilde{\xi}_{j-1}\tilde{\xi}_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < \tau]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{[\xi_N=l]} \right] \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}} \leq \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |\ell_{\xi_0 k}(\tau_1)| \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{D}},
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\xi}_j = \xi_j$ for $j = 1, \dots, N-2$, and $\tilde{\xi}_{N-1} = l$. Thus the desired result.

Point (ii) is obtained in the same way. First

$$-\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \leq -\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(T) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]}. \quad P - a.s.$$

Then by considering the set

$$\mathbb{D}_1 = \{\omega \in \Omega \text{ such that } \ell_{\xi_{N-1}\xi_N}(T) < 0\},$$

we show by induction that for any N and $(\tau_n, \xi_n)_{n \leq N}$,

$$-\sum_{j=1}^N \ell_{\xi_{j-1}\xi_j}(T) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} \leq \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |\ell_{\xi_0 k}(T)| \quad (4)$$

since $\ell_{ij}(T)$, $i, j \in \mathcal{J}$, verify the triangle inequality. □

3. Verification Theorem and its solution

We assume that $m = 3$; $\mathcal{J} = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $\mathcal{J}^{-i} = \mathcal{J} - \{i\}$.

Theorem: There exist **continuous** processes $(Y^i, Z^i, K^i)_{i=1,2,3}$ ($Y^i \in \mathcal{S}^2$) such that: for $i = 1, 2, 3$ and $t \leq T$,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Y_t^i = G_i + \int_t^T \psi_i(u) du - \int_t^T Z_u^i dB_u + K_T^i - K_t^i; \\ Y_t^i \geq \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-\ell_{ij}(t) + Y_t^j\}; \\ \int_0^T (Y_u^i - \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-\ell_{ij}(u) + Y_u^j\}) dK_u^i = 0 \end{array} \right. \quad (5)$$

Idea of the proof: recursive approximations.

For $i \in \mathcal{J} := \{1, 2, 3\}$

$$Y_t^{i,0} = E\left[\int_t^T \psi_i(s) ds + G_i | F_t\right]$$

and, for $n \geq 1$, $(Y^{i,n}, Z^{i,n}, K^{i,n})$ verifies: for $i = 1, 2, 3$ and $t \leq T$,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Y_t^{i,n} = G_i + \int_t^T \psi_i(u) du - \int_t^T Z_u^{i,n} dB_u + K_T^{i,n} - K_t^{i,n}; \\ Y_t^{i,n} \geq \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-\ell_{ij}(t) + Y_t^{j,n-1}\}; \\ \int_0^T (Y_u^{i,n} - \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-\ell_{ij}(u) + Y_u^{j,n-1}\}) dK_u^{i,n} = 0 \end{array} \right.$$

□


(6)

(i) Note that

$$Y_t^{i,n} + \int_0^t \psi_i(s) ds = \text{ess sup}_{\tau \geq t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\tau \psi_i(s) ds + \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-l_{ik}(\tau) + Y_\tau^{k,n-1}\} \mathbf{1}_{[\tau < T]} + G_i \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau = T\}} \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

The process $(Y_t^{i,n} + \int_0^t \psi_i(s) ds)_{t \leq T}$ is a Snell envelope of the process

$$\left(\int_0^t \psi_i(s) ds + \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-l_{ik}(t) + Y_t^{k,n-1}\} \mathbf{1}_{[t < T]} + G_i \mathbf{1}_{\{t = T\}} \right)_{t \leq T}.$$



(ii) Let

$\mathcal{D}_t^{i,n} = \{u = (\tau_n, \xi_n)_{n \geq 1}$ admissible, $u_0 = i$, $\tau_1 \geq t$ and $\tau_{n+1} = T\}$.

Then

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t^{i,n} &= \text{esssup}_{u \in \mathcal{D}_t^{i,n}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^T \psi_{u_s}(s) ds - \sum_{j \geq 1} \ell_{\xi_{j-1} \xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} + G_{u_T} | \mathcal{F}_t \right] \\ &= \text{esssup}_{u \in \mathcal{D}_t^{i,n}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^T \psi_{u_s}(s) ds - \sum_{j=1}^n \ell_{\xi_{j-1} \xi_j}(\tau_j) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_j < T]} + G_{u_T} | \mathcal{F}_t \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\mathcal{D}_t^{i,n} \subset \mathcal{D}_t^{i,n+1}$, we then have:

i) $Y_t^{i,n} \leq Y_t^{i,n+1}$.

ii)

$$Y_t^{i,n} \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^T \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |\psi_k(s)| ds + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} |G_k| + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \sup_{s \leq T} |\ell_{ik}(s)| \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

Thus the processes $Y^{i,n}$ are uniformly bounded. We set:

$$Y^i = \lim_n Y^{i,n}.$$


(i) Y^i is càdlàg.

$$Y_t^{i,n} = \text{ess sup}_{\tau \geq t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\tau \psi_i(s) ds + \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} (-\ell_{ik}(\tau) + Y_\tau^{k,n-1}) \mathbb{1}_{[\tau < T]} \mathbb{1}_{\{t < T\}} + G_i \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau = T\}} \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

Then $(Y_t^{i,n} + \int_0^t \psi_i(s) ds)_{t \leq T}$ is a supermartingale and Y^i is càdlàg as a limit of the increasing sequence.

(ii) Y^i verifies:

$$Y_t^i = \text{ess sup}_{\tau \geq t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\tau \psi_i(s) ds + \max_{k \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} (-\ell_{ik}(\tau) + Y_\tau^k) \mathbb{1}_{[\tau < T]} \mathbb{1}_{\{t < T\}} + G_i \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau = T\}} \mid F_t \right].$$



(ii) Y^i is continuous: Thanks to the non free loop property.

If for some t_0 , $\Delta_{t_0} Y^i := Y_{t_0}^i - Y_{t_0-}^i < 0$ then there exists $j \neq i$ such that

$$\Delta_{t_0} Y^j < 0 \text{ and } Y_{t_0-}^i = -g_{ij}(t_0) + Y_{t_0-}^j.$$

Repeat the procedure to obtain a loop j_1, \dots, j_{p-1} such that

$$g_{j_1 j_2}(t_0) + \dots + g_{j_{p-1} j_1}(t_0) = 0.$$

This is contradictory and then Y^i is continuous. By Dini's theorem

$$Y^{i,n} \rightarrow_n Y^i \text{ in } \mathcal{S}^2.$$

We set:

$$Z^i = \lim_n Z^{i,n}, K^i = \lim_n K^{i,n}$$

we obtain that $(Y^i, Z^i, K^i)_{i=1,2,3}$ verify the above system of reflected BSDEs with inter-connected obstacles (6).

3.1 Existence of an optimal strategy

Theorem: There is an optimal strategy $u^* = (\tau_n^*, \xi_n^*)_{n \geq 1}$.

Hint for the proof:

a) Definition of u^* :

- τ_1^* = the first time that Y^i reaches the obstacle
 $(\max_{j \in \mathcal{J}-i} \{-l_{ij}(t) + Y_t^j\})_{t \leq T}$.

- ξ_1^* is the optimal index at τ_1^* .

- τ_2^* = the first time that $Y^{\xi_1^*}$ reaches the obstacle after τ_1^* .

- ξ_2^* is the optimal index at τ_2^* , etc.

b) Part i) of admissibility stems from the NFLP implied by the triangle inequality.

c) Part ii) is due to:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_0^1 &= \sum_{k=1}^n G_{u_{\tau_{k-1}^*}} \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_k^* = T]} \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_{k-1}^* < T]} \\
 &\quad - \sum_{k=1}^n \ell_{u_{\tau_{k-1}^*}} u_{\tau_k^*}(\tau_k^*) \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_k^* < T]} + Y_{\tau_n^*}^{u_{\tau_n^*}} \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_n^* < T]} \\
 &\quad + \sum_{k=1}^n \int_{\tau_{k-1}^*}^{\tau_k^*} \psi_{u_{\tau_{k-1}^*}}(r) dr - \underbrace{\sum_{k=1}^n \int_{\tau_{k-1}^*}^{\tau_k^*} Z_r^{u_{\tau_{k-1}^*}} dB_r}_{= \int_0^{\tau_n^*} Z_r^* dB_r}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus

$$\mathbb{E}[\sup_{n \geq 1} |C_n^{u^*}|^2] < \infty$$

and the strategy u^* is admissible. Take the limit wrt n to obtain

$$Y_0^1 = J(u^*).$$

d) For any other admissible strategy u we have:

$$Y_0^1 \geq J(u). \quad \square$$

4. The Markov framework

Let $X^{t,x}$ be the solution of the following SDE:

$$dX_s^{t,x} = b(s, X_s^{t,x}) ds + \sigma(s, X_s^{t,x}) dB_s \text{ for } t \leq s \leq T \text{ and } X_s^{t,x} = x \text{ for } s \leq t.$$

Next assume that :

a) $\psi_i(s) = \psi_i(s, X_s^{t,x})$

b) $l_{ij}(s)$ does not depend on x

c) $G_i = G_i(X_T^{t,x})$

where $\psi_i(t, x)$, $l_{ij}(t)$ and $G_i(x)$ are continuous and of polynomial growth.

Then there exist deterministic functions v^j , $i = 1, \dots, m$, of polynomial growth such that

$$Y_s^{i,t,x} = v^j(s, X_s^{t,x}), \quad s \in [t, T].$$

Moreover:

Theorem:

The functions $(v^j)_{j=1,m}$ are continuous of polynomial growth and unique viscosity solution of: $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \min \left\{ v_i(t, x) - \max_{j \in \mathcal{J}^{-i}} \{-\ell_{ij}(t) + v_j(t, x)\}, -\partial_t v_i(t, x) - \mathcal{A}v_i(t, x) - \psi_i(t, x) \right\} \\ \quad = 0, \\ v_i(T, x) = G_i(x). \end{array} \right. \quad (7)$$

Example

- ▶ $m = 3$, $T = 1$, $\sigma = 1.5$, $b = 1$, $\mathcal{I} = \{1, 2, 3\}$.
- ▶ $\psi_1 = (-x^2 + 5x) \div 10$, $\psi_2 = 0$, $\psi_3 = (x^2 - 5x) \div 10$,
- ▶ $l_{12}(t) = t + 1.5$, $l_{13}(t) = t + 2$, $l_{21}(t) = t - 0.4$, $l_{23}(t) = t + 1.5$, $l_{31}(t) = t - 1$, $l_{32}(t) = t - 0.1$.
- ▶ $G_i = 0$.




Figure: Value functions.

5. Extension

- ▶ The switching payoffs can be monotonic on $[0, t_1]$ and on $[t_1, T]$ with different monotonicities.
- ▶ We can do the same if similar phenomenon happens on $[0, t_1]$, $[t_1, t_2]$, ..., $[t_k, T]$. □

Some references

- ▶ $T = \infty$ (Dixit-Pindyck '94, Duckworth-Zervos '01, Pham-Vath '07, Pham-Vath-Zhou '09).
- ▶ two modes (Ham.-Jeanblanc MOR '07)
- ▶ several modes (Djehiche-H.-Popier '09, H.-Zhang '10, Hu-Tang '10)
- ▶ exponential utilities (Porchet-Touzi-Warin, '06; H.-Wang '09)
- ▶ randomization (Fuhrman-Morlais '20, Benezet-Chassagneux-Richou '22)
- ▶ ergodicity (Bayraktar-Cosso-Pham '18)
- ▶ numerical treatment within several modes (Carmona-Ludkovski, '06, Chassagneux-Elie-Kharroubi '12, Chassagneux-Richou '19, etc.).

The list is far from exhaustive.

Thanks for your attention.